Missouri Law Review
Volume 84
Issue 2 Spring 2019

Article 9

Spring 2019

Uncorrected Injustice: Plain Error Review of Misapplied
Sentencing Law
Alec D. Guy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alec D. Guy, Uncorrected Injustice: Plain Error Review of Misapplied Sentencing Law, 84 MO. L. REV. (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Guy: Uncorrected Injustice: Plain Error Review of Misapplied Sentencin

NOTE
Uncorrected Injustice: Plain Error Review of
Misapplied Sentencing Law
State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. 2018) (en banc)
Alec D. Guy*

I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal convictions often result in a restriction on the defendant’s freedom and a deprivation of the defendant’s liberty. Given the gravity of these
consequences, there are multiple procedures the court must follow not only in
determining guilt but also in imposing a sentence. Sentencing ranges are an
essential component of criminal law. In Missouri, sentencing ranges are found
in statutes,1 and these statutes help trial judges determine what sentence to impose. Unfortunately, these guidelines can be incorrectly applied. If these errors are not addressed at the trial level, the appellate process can provide relief.
However, interesting questions arise when the error is not preserved and courts
are required to apply plain error review instead of the abuse of discretion standard.
In State v. Perry,2 the Supreme Court of Missouri conducted plain error
review of the application of an incorrect sentencing range. The court held that,
in order to prevail under plain error review, the defendant must prove the sentence was based on a mistaken belief about the sentencing range.3 The court
affirmed Perry’s sentence,4 even though the sentencing judge, the prosecutor,
and Perry’s own counsel agreed upon the incorrect sentencing range.5 This
Note analyzes the Supreme Court of Missouri’s reasoning in Perry and considers the limited ability of defendants to obtain relief, both on direct appeal and
in seeking postconviction relief, when the incorrect sentencing range is used
but the error is not preserved for appellate review. This Note argues the Supreme Court of Missouri should have created a rebuttable presumption of prejudice when an incorrect sentencing range is applied. Finally, this Note posits

* B.S. Political Science and Economics, Missouri Western State University, 2017; J.D.
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2020. I would like to thank Dean
Litton for his insight and guidance during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1. See MO. REV. STAT. § 558.011 (2018); id. § 558.016.
2. 548 S.W.3d 292, 300–01 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
3. Id. at 301.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 297.
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that judicial integrity, as well as public confidence in the judiciary, is undermined due to the result and implications of Perry.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Joseph Perry was charged with possession of a controlled substance with
the intent to distribute.6 This charge was based on Perry’s conversation with,
and attempted escape from, a police officer.7 The officer noticed Perry backing
out of his driveway and started following him.8 The police officer believed
Perry’s license was suspended, but she was unable to verify this information as
she followed him.9 Perry then reached his fiancé’s house and pulled into the
driveway.10 The officer stopped, approached Perry, and asked to speak with
him.11 Perry obliged, and the officer asked to see his license.12 After obtaining
Perry’s license, the officer attempted to verify it was valid but could not do so
because her radio was not functioning properly.13 During this time period,
Perry began acting suspiciously.14 He reached into his pocket and took out
what appeared to be a plastic bag.15 The officer asked Perry to come over to
her.16 Instead, Perry took a bike out of the back of his truck and walked to the
front of the vehicle, all while keeping the bag clenched in his fist.17 The officer
followed Perry to the front of the vehicle, where he quickly threw down the
bike and began running.18 Perry briefly hesitated when he came to a fence but
then climbed over.19 Eventually, he surrendered, and a plastic bag of methamphetamine was found in the fence Perry scaled.20
The prosecutor charged Perry with one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute.21 Perry filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine, arguing it was unlawfully seized because the police officer requested his driver’s license without a reasonable suspicion Perry was engaged
in criminal activity, but his motion was denied.22 A jury found Perry guilty of

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 296–97.
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 295–96.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 296–97.
Id. at 297.
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the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance.23 During
sentencing, the prosecutor stated the sentencing range was five to fifteen years’
imprisonment in the Department of Corrections and recommended an eightyear sentence.24 The prosecutor noted Perry was not convicted of the charged
crime but instead possession of a controlled substance,25 which is a class C
felony carrying a sentencing range of one year in the county jail to seven years
in the Department of Corrections.26 However, Perry was subject to enhanced
penalties because he was deemed a persistent offender.27 The prosecutor argued the applicable range was still five to fifteen years, due to the enhanced
penalties.28 Perry’s counsel did not object at the sentencing hearing29 but instead agreed five to fifteen years was accurate.30 Yet, the correct range of punishment was one year in the county jail to fifteen years in the Department of
Corrections because “[a]t the time of sentencing, only the maximum sentence
increased for a persistent offender, while the minimum sentence was unaffected.”31 Perry was then sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.32
Perry first appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, but the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri after the
Western District issued an opinion.33 There, Perry raised two arguments.34 He
argued the trial court erred in sentencing him to eight years’ imprisonment because the court operated “under a materially false belief” regarding the sentencing range.35 Further, he contended the trial court erred in overruling his
motion to suppress the methamphetamine because he was unlawfully seized
during his interaction with the police officer.36 The majority held the trial court
did not err in sentencing Perry to eight years’ imprisonment37 or denying
Perry’s motion to suppress.38 Consequently, the judgment of the trial court was
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id. A persistent offender is someone “who has been found guilty of two or
more felonies committed at different times.” MO. REV. STAT. § 558.016.7 (2018).
28. Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 297.
29. Id. at 300.
30. Id. at 297.
31. Id. at 300 (alteration in original).
32. Id. at 297.
33. State v. Perry, No. WD 78653, 2016 WL 6081854 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 18,
2016), aff’d, 548 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
34. Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 295.
35. Id. at 300.
36. Id. at 297.
37. Id. at 301.
38. Id. at 300. Perry argued he had been unlawfully seized because the police
officer requested his license without a reasonable suspicion that he had participated in
criminal activity. Id. at 297. Based on the surrounding circumstances, the court held
Perry was never seized and, as a result, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.
Id. at 300. Additionally, Judge Breckenridge, in her partial concurrence and partial
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affirmed.39 The dissent agreed the trial court did not err in dismissing Perry’s
motion to suppress but argued Perry established plain error regarding his sentencing claim.40

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Sentencing law has become complex, and mistakes in applying sentencing law are common. First, this Part briefly introduces Missouri sentencing
law and explains the error committed in Perry. Next, this Part details multiple
Missouri cases that have addressed misapplications of sentencing law. Finally,
this Part examines how the federal appellate courts have applied plain error
review to incorrect application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).

A. Missouri Sentencing Law
In Missouri, the sentencing scheme is codified in the Revised Statutes of
Missouri.41 These statutes provide the sentencing ranges for both misdemeanors and felonies,42 and the Supreme Court of Missouri has determined judges
must impose a sentence within the specified range.43 Chapter 558 provides
further guidance concerning other aspects of sentencing.44 For example, this
chapter details the general rules for imposing multiple sentences and explains
how the sentencing ranges are altered when the defendant is a prior or persistent offender.45 Additionally, Missouri has established an eleven-member Sentencing Advisory Commission (the “Commission”) that is responsible for various duties.46 For example, the Commission studies the sentencing practices
of Missouri trial courts, determines if there are sentencing disparities based on
social and economic statuses, and investigates alternative sentences as well as
alternative programs.47 The Commission occasionally publishes a user guide.48
Previously, the guide included a system of recommended sentences, but in

dissent, agreed with the majority’s ruling that the trial court did not err in dismissing
Perry’s motion to suppress. Id. at 301 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This point will not be discussed further in this Note.
39. Id. at 301 (majority opinion).
40. Id. at 302 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41. See MO. REV. STAT. ch. 558 (2018).
42. Id. § 558.011.
43. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 234 n.2 (Mo. 2013) (en banc).
44. See MO. REV. STAT. § 558.026; id. § 558.016.
45. Id. § 558.026; id. § 558.016.
46. Id. § 558.019.6(1).
47. Id. § 558.019.6(2).
48. See MO. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM’N, USER GUIDE 2015–2016 1 (2016),
https://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=102733.
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2012, section 558.019 was amended to remove this requirement of the Commission.49
Missouri sentencing law imposes an increased range of punishment for
defendants found to be persistent offenders – that is, individuals “who [have]
been found guilty of two or more felonies committed at different times.”50 At
the time of Perry’s sentencing, the statute only increased the maximum term of
imprisonment to the next felony level.51 Unfortunately, trial courts, much like
the trial court in Perry, were increasing both the minimum and maximum sentence, which led to the application of an erroneous sentencing range.52 The
applicable statute has since been amended. Missouri’s sentencing scheme now
provides that persistent offenders who are sentenced to a class B, C, D, or E
felony must be sentenced at the “authorized term of imprisonment for the offense that is one class higher than the offense for which the person is found
guilty.”53 Consequently, both the maximum and minimum punishment will
increase for persistent offenders.

B. Missouri Case Law
One of the leading Missouri cases addressing an incorrect application of
sentencing law is Wraggs v. State.54 There, the defendant was sentenced to
thirteen years’ imprisonment for a conviction of assault with intent to maim
with malice.55 Wraggs was convicted under the Habitual Criminal Act, and the
judge explicitly referenced Wraggs’ prior convictions at sentencing.56 Wraggs
had previously been convicted of two robberies.57 Those convictions were later
vacated, and Wraggs pleaded guilty to one count of robbery instead of two.58
Based on this change, Wraggs filed a motion to set aside the sentence in the
assault case, arguing the thirteen-year sentence was founded on an illegal and

49. Id. Compare id. § 558.019.6 (2012), with id. § 558.019.6 (2011).
50. Id. § 558.016.3.
51. Id. § 558.016.7 (2013). The statute stated that
[t]he total authorized maximum terms of imprisonment for a persistent offender
or a dangerous offender are: (1) For a class A felony, any sentence authorized
for a class A felony; (2) For a class B felony, any sentence authorized for a class
A felony; (3) For a class C felony, any sentence authorized for a class B felony;
(4) For a class D felony, any sentence authorized for a class C felony.

Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 300 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
MO. REV. STAT. § 558.016.7 (2018).
549 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
Id. at 882.
Id. at 882–83.
Id. at 883.
Id.
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invalidated conviction.59 The trial court denied the motion because the conviction was based on a prior burglary conviction, not the robbery convictions.60
The Supreme Court of Missouri determined the sentence had to be set
aside because it depended on “assumptions concerning [Wraggs’] criminal record which were materially untrue.”61 The court explained the trial judge believed Wraggs had been convicted of five felonies when he had only been legally convicted of three felonies.62 The rationale was that the sentence “might
have been different if the sentencing judge had known that at least two of (appellant’s) previous convictions had been (illegally) obtained.”63 The court determined that on the record before it, “the conclusion [wa]s inescapable that
the sentencing judge . . . took into consideration ‘the totality’ of appellant’s
prior convictions, including the two 10-year robbery sentences later invalidated.”64 Ultimately, the thirteen-year sentence was vacated, and the case was
remanded for resentencing.65
Since Wraggs, the Missouri appellate courts have decided various cases
where the trial court has misstated or misapplied sentencing law, and the courts
often reach different results – sometimes plain error is found and sometimes it
is not. When a mistake is not preserved, the appellate court can only review
for plain error.66 Relief will be granted under this standard only if “the alleged
error so substantially affects the rights of the accused that a manifest injustice
or miscarriage of justice inexorably results if left uncorrected.”67 Further,
“[m]anifest injustice is determined by the facts and circumstances of the case,
and the defendant bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice.”68
In State v. Elam, the defendant was convicted of first-degree statutory
rape and first-degree statutory sodomy.69 Elam was sentenced to fifteen and
ten years, respectively, and the sentences were to run consecutively.70 On appeal, Elam argued the court committed plain error in imposing consecutive
sentences because the State contended consecutive sentences were mandatory
when, in fact, they were not.71 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern
District explained that if “the trial court imposed consecutive sentences instead
of concurrent sentences based on a misunderstanding of the law, such conduct
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948)).
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972)).
Id. at 884.
Id. at 886.
State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Mo. 2010) (en banc).
State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (citing State v.
Sidebottom, 753 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)).
68. State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (citing State v.
Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615, 624 (Mo. 2001) (en banc)).
69. 493 S.W.3d 38, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
70. Id. at 40.
71. Id. at 42.
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is plain error and the defendant is entitled to re-sentencing,” but if the sentence
was imposed based on other valid considerations, resentencing is not required.72 Here, the trial court considered that Elam’s crimes were serious and
ongoing and that he had a fairly clean criminal record when the sentence was
imposed.73 Because the court believed the sentences were based on these considerations and not a mistake regarding the law, the court held Elam did not
establish plain error.74
The same result was reached in State v. Scott.75 There, the defendant argued the trial court plainly erred in imposing consecutive sentences because
the judge incorrectly believed consecutive sentences were required.76 The
court stated no error would be found if the consecutive sentences were imposed
based on valid considerations, like severity of the crimes.77 The court determined the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively because of
proper considerations.78 Specifically, after the prosecutor stated the consecutive sentences appeared to be required, the judge asked for the defense’s position, and the defense argued the court had discretion in sentencing.79 Then, the
judge “commended the courage shown by the victims and commented that he
believed the jury appropriately recommended life sentences.”80 All of this
showed the judge exercised independent discretion when he imposed the consecutive sentences; the judge did not simply rely on the prosecutor’s misinterpretation of the statute.81
In other instances, appellate courts have found plain error when the trial
judge has misstated or misapplied sentencing law. In State v. Olney, Olney
was convicted of first-degree assault and armed criminal action.82 The trial
court sentenced him as a persistent offender and imposed consecutive ten-year
sentences.83 Olney argued the trial court committed plain error in imposing
consecutive sentences because the judge believed consecutive sentences were
72. Id. at 43.
73. Id. at 44.
74. Id. Further, the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District has found plain

error where the minimum sentence was improperly calculated and the defendant was
given the minimum sentence. State v. Troya, 407 S.W.3d 695, 700–01 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013) (finding defendant’s “sentence was passed on a mistaken belief that he was subject to a minimum term of ten years’ imprisonment” and remanding under plain error
review).
75. 348 S.W.3d 788 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
76. Id. at 799.
77. Id. at 800.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 954 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), abrogated by State v. Pierce, 548
S.W.3d 900 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
83. Id.
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mandatory.84 Yet, the armed criminal action statute did not require consecutive
sentences.85 The State argued prejudice was not shown because the trial court
would have imposed the same sentence even in the absence of a mistaken belief.86 The State reinforced that during sentencing, the judge noted the “horrendous” nature of Olney’s past crimes and advised Olney’s counsel not to seek
the minimum sentence because that “was not a reasonable argument here.”87
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District acknowledged the
State made a strong argument but determined remand for resentencing was appropriate because sentencing is the trial court’s responsibility and the Western
District did not want to interfere with the lower court’s authority.88
A similar result was reached in State v. Cowan.89 In that case, the defendant was found guilty of burglary and stealing.90 Similar to Perry, Cowan was
found to be a prior and persistent offender, which impacted his possible punishment.91 Due to this designation, the trial court determined Cowan would be
subject to the Class A sentencing range of ten to thirty years.92 The minimum
sentence, however, remained at the Class B level, regardless of the enhancement, and should have been five years.93 The court remanded the case for resentencing, noting the trial court never addressed the mistake or showed
Cowan’s sentence was based on the correct range.94
As the cases discussed above illustrate, the Missouri appellate courts have
taken different approaches in conducting plain error review of misapplied sentencing law. An analysis of these Missouri cases shows the appellate court’s
plain error review can result in one of three outcomes: (1) refusal to remand
under plain error review because the sentencing judge listed other valid considerations that served as a basis for the sentence, (2) remand under plain error
review because the sentence was based on a mistaken belief, or (3) remand

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 699–700.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701. Missouri appellate courts have remanded for plain error in similar
situations. See, e.g., State v. Summers, 456 S.W.3d 441, 446–47 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)
(finding plain error where the trial court thought an armed criminal action sentence
must run consecutive and remanding for resentencing on the same basis as Olney), abrogated by State v. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d 900 (Mo. 2018) (en banc); State v. Powell, 380
S.W.3d 632, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (finding plain error where the record implied the
trial court believed consecutive sentences were mandatory), abrogated by Pierce, 548
S.W.3d 900.
89. 247 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008), abrogated by Pierce, 548 S.W.3d
900.
90. Id. at 618.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 619.
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under plain error review even if there were other valid reasons given by the
trial court.
State v. Pierce,95 the companion case to State v. Perry, involved a conviction for one count of possession of child pornography and a sentence of fifteen
years’ imprisonment. Pierce claimed his sentence was based on a “materially
false understanding of the possible range of punishment,” as the court stated
the incorrect range of ten to thirty years at sentencing.96 Possession of child
pornography is a class B felony with a range of punishment of five to fifteen
years.97 Pierce was found to be a persistent offender, which increased the maximum punishment to that of a class A felony or thirty years.98 However, at the
time Pierce was convicted, the minimum punishment did not increase to the
class A minimum of ten years but instead remained at five years.99 As a result,
the permissible range of punishment for Pierce was five to thirty years instead
of ten to thirty years.100
Pierce failed to object to this error during sentencing, and consequently,
he asked for plain error review.101 The Supreme Court of Missouri explained
that “[a] sentence passed on the basis of a materially false foundation lacks due
process of law and entitles the defendant to a reconsideration of the question
of punishment in the light of the true facts, regardless of the eventual outcome.”102 However, the court in Pierce determined the trial court’s mistaken
belief regarding the applicable sentencing range did not alone entitle a defendant to relief under plain error review.103 To prevail, the defendant must show
the trial court sentenced him based on the mistaken belief.104 In support of this
holding, the court noted the invalidated convictions in Wraggs “played a significant part” in the sentencing judge’s decision.105 Further, the majority explained Missouri courts of appeal do not remand cases for resentencing if the
sentences imposed by the trial court were unaffected by the mistaken sentencing range and were based on other valid considerations.106
Unlike Wraggs, where the court found the defendant showed his sentence
“might have been different” if not for the judge’s mistaken belief regarding his
prior convictions,107 the court ultimately determined Pierce did not show the
sentence was founded on the trial court’s mistake regarding the permissible
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

548 S.W.3d 900, 902 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 903–04.
Id. at 904.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 905.
Id. (quoting Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)).
Id.
Wraggs, 549 S.W.2d at 883 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,
448 (1972)).
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sentencing range.108 In fact, the trial court mentioned several factors before
pronouncing the sentence and acknowledged these factors were the foundation
for the sentence.109 As a result, Pierce was unable to show the manifest injustice required to establish plain error.110
In her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Judge Patricia Breckenridge
argued the majority in Pierce ignored the manifest injustice that results when
a judge sentences a defendant while misunderstanding the range of punishment.111 In addition, Missouri courts have consistently found plain error when
the judge misstates the sentencing range on the record or where the judge incorrectly believed the law required consecutive sentences – even if the court is
reviewing for plain error.112 Judge Breckenridge contended the cases the majority cited were distinguishable from Pierce because those cases involved the
prosecutor misstating the law and the record did not show the trial court relied
on those errors.113 Judge Breckenridge further argued Wraggs created a different standard than the one articulated by the majority.114 In Wraggs, the court
determined “[t]he pertinent question is whether the sentence was predicated on
misinformation; whether the sentence might have been different if the sentencing judge had known that at least two of appellant’s previous convictions had
been illegally obtained.”115 As a result, Judge Breckenridge argued, the test
should be “whether the sentence might have been different had the [trial]
court’s sentence not been predicated on the mistaken sentencing range.”116
In addition, the sentencing court must abide by the statutorily approved
range of punishment.117 Judge Breckenridge noted that, because of this, the
sentencing range inherently affects the sentence and a different sentence might
have resulted if the trial court knew of the correct sentencing range.118 Finally,
Judge Breckenridge argued the standard the majority created is nearly impossible for defendants to meet, as relief will only be afforded if the sentencing
judge states the incorrect sentencing range is the basis for the sentence.119 For
these reasons, Judge Breckenridge would have vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.120

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Pierce, 548 S.W.3d at 906.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 907 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 907–08.
Id. at 908.
Id. (quoting Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)).
Id. at 908–09.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Federal Case Law
The federal circuit courts have taken different approaches in cases where
the Guidelines have been incorrectly applied. The United States Sentencing
Commission (the “U.S. Commission”) first submitted guidelines to Congress
on April 13, 1987, and the Guidelines took effect later that year.121 The U.S.
Commission can submit amendments to Congress every year, and these
changes take effect after 180 days, unless Congress enacts a contrary law. 122
The U.S. Commission must “prescribe guideline ranges that specify an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons determined by coordinating
the offense behavior categories with the offender characteristic categories.”123
Sentencing courts are required to select a sentence within the appropriate range,
but a court can depart from the recommended range if the case presents atypical
features.124 The court must specify the reasons for a departure from the Guidelines.125 When reviewing a sentence within the recommended range, an appellate court determines whether the Guidelines were applied correctly.126 If the
lower court did not issue a sentence within the specified range, the appellate
court decides whether a departure from the appropriate range was reasonable.127 However, a different standard of review is used when the alleged error
is not preserved at the trial level.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit will find plain error when
the error is “clear or obvious” and has impacted “substantial rights.”128 To
show substantial rights were affected in the sentencing context, defendants
must show there is a reasonable probability they would have received a lower
sentence if the correct range had been used.129 Even if this is shown, the appellate court still has discretion in providing relief, which will be exercised
“only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.’”130
In United States v. Davis,131 the defendant was five months into a supervised release term when he violated the terms of his release. The district court
used a sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-one months, but the correct range
was six to twelve months.132 At sentencing, the district court mentioned,
121. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 2018 2 (2018),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Davis, 602 F.3d 643, 647 (5th Cir. 2010).
129. Id.
130. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135
(2009)).
131. Id. at 645.
132. Id. at 645–46.
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among other circumstances, that Davis had only completed five months of the
five year supervised release term, that Davis had a firearm, and that some of
his possessions showed he intended to resume the conduct that led to his original conviction.133 The Fifth Circuit noted the district judge imposed a sentence
higher than even the incorrect maximum (twenty-four months) and determined
the district court had “ample independent bases for imposing the sentence that
it did . . . .”134 As a result, Davis did not meet the reasonable probability standard.135 Further, given the circumstances of the supervised release violation, the
court held the imposition of the twenty-four-month sentence did not have a
serious effect on the “fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”136
Before 2016, the Fifth Circuit imposed an additional burden on the defendant in certain circumstances. If the correct and incorrect sentencing ranges
overlapped and the defendant’s sentence fell within the common ground of the
ranges, the defendant had to provide additional evidence to show substantial
rights had been affected.137 When a sentence fell within both the correct and
incorrect sentencing range, the Fifth Circuit showed “‘considerable reluctance
in finding a reasonable probability that the district court would have settled on
a lower sentence.’”138 Further, in the Fifth Circuit, casual statements by the
sentencing judge were deemed insufficient to show a reasonable probability of
a different result.139 The court determined the additional evidence rule was
sensible, as the imposed sentence was within the correct range.140 However, in
Molina-Martinez v. United States,141 the United States Supreme Court rejected
the additional evidence rule. The Court explained the Guidelines are “the sentencing court’s ‘starting point and . . . initial benchmark.’”142 Given their central role in the sentencing process, Guidelines errors can be serious, and the
district court commits a serious procedural error when the Guidelines are miscalculated.143
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 648.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651 (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).
United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 290 (5th Cir. 2011). A defendant
could meet the reasonable probability standard, without additional evidence, if “(1) the
district court mistakenly calculates the wrong Guideline range, (2) the incorrect range
is significantly higher than the true Guideline range, and (3) the defendant is sentenced
within the incorrect range.” Id. at 289.
138. United States v. Blocker, 612 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United
States v. Campo-Ramirez, 379 Fed. App’x 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2010), abrogated by
United States v. Sustaita-Mata, 728 Fed. App’x 402 (5th Cir. 2018)).
139. Id. at 416–17.
140. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d at 290.
141. See 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016).
142. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49
(2007)).
143. Id. at 1345–46 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
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Referencing various statistics that illustrated how courts use the Guidelines, the Court, in Molina-Martinez, explained, “[T]he Guidelines are not only
the starting point for most federal sentencing proceedings but also the lodestar.”144 Thus, if the defendant shows the court used an incorrect, higher sentencing range, reasonable probability of a different outcome has likely been
shown.145 However, in some circumstances, even in the presence of an incorrect, higher sentencing range, a reasonable probability of prejudice might not
be apparent.146 For example, the record might include an explanation that
shows the judge imposed the sentence due to other independent factors.147 Absent such circumstances, prejudice is shown if the defendant can establish an
incorrect, higher sentencing range was applied.148 The Court further noted defendants will often not be able to show additional evidence because judges
rarely articulate how the Guidelines have impacted the sentence.149 Therefore,
the cases where the Guideline range had an impact are the least likely to have
additional evidence.150 Ultimately, because the Guideline range will affect a
sentence in most cases, the Court held defendants are allowed to rely on this
fact when trying to show a reasonable probability that a different sentence
would have been imposed under the correct Guidelines, which “is needed to
establish an effect on substantial rights for purposes of obtaining relief under
[plain error].”151
Other circuits, however, have been more lenient in their plain error review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explains plain error
requires “a defendant [to] show that (1) the district court erred; (2) the error
was plain; (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.”152 If there is an “obvious misapplication of the sentencing guidelines,” the third and fourth elements of plain error are normally satisfied.153
The court noted that “the Guidelines are intended to, and do, affect sentencing.”154 In fact, the court explained the entire purpose of the Guidelines is to

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1346.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1347.
Id.
Id. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has specifically “told judges that
they need not provide extensive explanations for within-Guidelines sentences because
‘[c]ircumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356–57 (2007)). Additionally, appellate courts can presume a sentence
is reasonable, if it falls within the correctly calculated Guideline range. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1349.
152. United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 2014).
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001)).
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impact substantial rights by assisting the district court in determining how
much liberty the defendant must relinquish to the government.155
Additionally, the Guidelines operate as a starting point, and if the starting
point is incorrect, there is a reasonable probability the final result is incorrect.156 Regarding the fourth prong of the Tenth Circuit’s test, a reasonable
citizen’s view of judicial integrity would likely be diminished when a court
does not fix an error of its own creation that could lead to a longer prison sentence.157 This is particularly true in circumstances where the correction would
not be difficult, as the “district court [only needs] to exercise its authority to
impose a legally permissible sentence.”158 Due to the above considerations,
the Tenth Circuit determined “[a] presumption that the third and fourth prongs
are met by obvious [G]uidelines errors is . . . sensible . . . .”159 However, this
presumption can be overcome if the sentencing judge makes a “fortuitous comment” that shows the Guidelines error did not negatively impact the final sentence.160
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has created a presumption
of prejudice in these cases as well.161 The United States Supreme Court has
explained that in some cases, where specific prejudice cannot be shown, a presumption of prejudicial error is warranted.162 The Third Circuit articulated two
reasons for creating a presumption in this scenario.163 First, “the Guidelines
are intended to, and do, affect sentencing.”164 Second, determining the effect
of an incorrect Guideline range without a “fortuitous comment” from the sentencing judge will be difficult.165 The practical impact of this presumption is
that “a sentence based upon a plainly erroneous Guideline range will ordinarily
be remanded so that the [d]istrict [c]ourt may exercise its discretion to choose
an appropriate sentence based upon the correct range, unless the record shows
that the sentence was unaffected by the error.”166

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001).
Id. (quoting United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 208. Other courts have reached similar results and remanded for resentencing when the district court erred in calculating the Guideline range. See United
States v. Vargem, 747 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have held that when a sentencing judge incorrectly calculates the Guideline[] range, potentially resulting in the
imposition of a greater sentence, the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights and
‘the fairness of the judicial proceedings.’”); United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 1171
(7th Cir. 1994) (holding that remand is appropriate where an incorrect Guideline range
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Perry contended he was
sentenced “under a materially false belief” regarding the permissible sentencing range.167 Under Wraggs, “[a] sentence passed on the basis of a materially
false foundation lacks due process of law and entitles the defendant to a reconsideration of the question of punishment in the light of the true facts, regardless
of the eventual outcome.”168 The court explained that, under plain error review,
Perry must show the trial court’s sentence was based on the mistaken belief
regarding the sentencing range.169 Thus, the trial court holding a mistaken belief about the sentencing range is not enough.170 Here, the majority found Perry
did not show the sentence was based on the judge’s mistaken belief.171 The
Supreme Court of Missouri emphasized that the trial court did not sentence
Perry to the minimum sentence but instead followed the prosecutor’s recommendation of eight years.172 In making the recommendation, the prosecutor
discussed Perry was not a candidate for probation and emphasized his prior
felony convictions.173 Perry was unable to meet his burden, and as a result, the
majority affirmed the trial court’s judgement.174
In her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Judge Breckenridge disagreed with the holding that the trial court did not err in sentencing Perry.175
Judge Breckenridge explained Missouri courts have consistently found plain
error when the trial court misstated the sentencing range on the record.176 Here,
the trial court misstated the range, incorrectly asserting it was five to fifteen
years in the Department of Corrections. The correct range was between one
year in the county jail and up to fifteen years in the Department of Corrections.177
Judge Breckenridge argued the fact Perry was not sentenced to the minimum punishment is immaterial.178 The true question is “whether the sentence
might have been different.”179 Judge Breckenridge contended that knowledge
of the correct range is a prerequisite to imposing a sentence and an incorrect
was used, “unless [there is] reason to believe that the error did not affect the district
court’s selection of a particular sentence”).
167. State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 300 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
168. Id. at 301 (quoting Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc)).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 301 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. Id. at 302.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)).
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range could impact the sentence.180 Due process does not allow a court to impose a sentence predicated on a materially false premise, like application of an
incorrect sentencing range, and entitles the defendant to “reconsideration of the
question of punishment in light of the true facts, regardless of the eventual outcome.”181 Judge Breckenridge argued the majority ignored these due process
considerations and created an almost impossible burden by requiring one to
show the sentence was based only on a mistaken belief as to the applicable
sentencing range.182 Finally, Judge Breckenridge asserted that “[i]mposing [a]
sentence upon a mistaken belief as to the range of punishment is manifestly
unjust and results in plain error.”183 Therefore, according to Judge Breckenridge, Perry’s sentence should have been vacated and the case should have been
remanded for resentencing.184

V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Perry greatly hinders a defendant’s chances of obtaining relief under plain error review when the trial
court uses an incorrect sentencing range. The specific sentencing error in Perry
is no longer possible because the statute was amended in 2018 to provide that
persistent offenders are sentenced using the range of “the offense that is one
class higher than the offense for which the person is found guilty” rather than
just increasing the maximum sentence.185 However, sentencing judges can still
make a mistake regarding the applicable sentencing range. Further, there are
many nuances in Missouri’s sentencing scheme, and the holding of Perry can
apply to other misapplications of sentencing law. For example, many of the
Missouri appellate court cases discussed above address alleged errors regarding the imposition of consecutive sentences. First, this Part analyzes the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Perry and argues the court’s rationale is flawed. Second, this Part discusses the heavy burden created by
Perry as well as the difficulty of meeting this burden. Third, this Part considers
the possibility of defendants seeking postconviction relief when mistakes in
sentencing are made but determines most defendants will be unsuccessful in
obtaining this sort of relief. Ultimately, this Part concludes that relief of any
kind is improbable, and due to this, judicial integrity, as well as public confidence in the judicial system, is undermined by the plain error standard set forth
in Perry.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id. (quoting Wraggs, 549 S.W.2d at 884).
Id.
Id.
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 558.016.7 (2018).
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A. Reasoning of the Supreme Court of Missouri
The Supreme Court of Missouri determined Perry did not establish his
sentence was based on the mistaken belief held by the trial court.186 In justifying this conclusion, the court noted that the trial judge did not enter the minimum possible sentence and the trial judge was following the prosecutor’s recommendation.187 At sentencing, the prosecutor indicated the range of punishment was five to fifteen years and argued that, due to Perry’s actions and criminal history, he was not eligible for probation.188 The prosecutor then recommended an eight-year sentence.189
First, the court’s reliance on the fact the trial judge followed the prosecutor’s recommended sentence is misplaced. As stated above, the prosecutor erroneously believed the range of punishment was five to fifteen years.190 The
correct range of punishment was one year in the county jail to fifteen years in
the Department of Corrections.191 Thus, even the prosecutor was operating
under a mistaken belief regarding the applicable sentencing range. The prosecutor did mention some considerations aside from the sentencing range, such
as Perry’s actions and criminal history, but these were referenced to reject the
possibility of probation.192 Additionally, the prosecutor explicitly referenced
the range when recommending the sentence.193 As a result, the prosecutor’s
recommendation could have been skewed, which would, in turn, impact
Perry’s sentence because the court followed this recommendation.
The Supreme Court of Missouri further determined the defendant’s sentence must be based on the mistaken belief to establish manifest injustice,194
but, given the importance of the range of punishment, a miscalculation could
have an adverse impact on the sentence even if there are other reasons for the
sentence. The range of punishment plays a large role in the determination of a
sentence, and Missouri should follow in the footsteps of the federal courts. The
United States Supreme Court has explained the “Guidelines [are the] starting
point and initial benchmark . . .” of sentencing.195 Additionally, the central
purpose of the Guidelines is to impact sentencing.196 As a result, federal courts

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 301 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The prosecutor stated, “I believe that Mr. Perry’s actions indicate that he’s
not a candidate for probation. His history indicates the same.” Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.; see also State v. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d 900, 906 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
195. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007).
196. United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001).
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have determined an error in calculating the Guideline range can negatively impact the sentence.197 In fact, miscalculation of the Guideline range is a “significant procedural error.”198 The federal courts have reached this conclusion
even though the Guidelines are not the only consideration in imposing a sentence and district judges can impose sentences outside of the applicable
range.199
In Missouri, the statutory sentencing range arguably has an even larger
impact than in the federal court system. As Judge Breckenridge’s partial concurrence and partial dissent in Pierce noted, “a defendant must be sentenced
within the statutorily approved range of punishments.”200 Unlike sentencing at
the federal level, Missouri judges are bound to follow the statutory range of
punishment. As a result, trial court judges carefully consult the permissible
range when imposing a sentence even if there are other considerations. Those
further considerations simply explain where a specific sentence falls within the
range.201 As Judge Breckenridge noted, “[t]he correct range of punishment,
therefore, is an essential predicate to imposing any sentence, and sentencing a
defendant when mistaken as to that applicable range inherently affects the sentencing process and might lead to a different sentence.”202 Thus, if the trial
court only holds a mistaken belief regarding the sentencing range, rather than
basing the sentence on the mistaken belief, the error can “so substantially affect[] the rights of the accused that a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice
inexorably results if left uncorrected,”203 which successfully establishes a claim
for plain error. Additionally, the fact Perry’s sentence fell within the correct
range of punishment is immaterial. Given the importance of Missouri’s sentencing guidelines, the sentence could still be impacted by the erroneous range.
As the Third Circuit has explained, an individual “has a right to a sentence that
197. See United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2007) (“To the extent
that this starting point was incorrect (a lower-end sentence of 346 months as opposed
to 324 months), it is certainly possible that the overall sentence was incorrect as well.”).
198. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
199. Id. at 49–50.
200. State v. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d 900, 909 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (Breckenridge, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 234 n.2
(Mo. 2013) (en banc)).
201. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 234 n.2 (“Under section 557.036.3, the responsibility for
‘assessing and declaring’ a defendant’s punishment in Missouri rests with the jury, unless the defendant waives this procedure or the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is a repeat offender in one of the categories excluded by section
557.036.4(2). After the jury makes this determination (and in all cases when jury sentencing is not applicable or the jury is unable to agree), the trial court imposes a sentence (within the statutorily approved range of punishments) that is appropriate under
all the circumstances. In doing so, however, the trial court may not impose a greater
sentence than the punishment assessed and declared by the jury (provided it was within
the authorized range) and, if the jury assesses and declares a punishment below the
lawful range, the trial court must impose the minimum lawful sentence.”).
202. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d at 909.
203. State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 300–01 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
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not only falls within a legally permissible range, but that was imposed pursuant
to correctly applied law.”204 Even though Perry’s sentence is within the legally
prescribed range, there is doubt as to whether the law was correctly applied.
Consequently, Perry should have another sentencing hearing, which will at
least ensure the law is truly understood and applied accurately.
The Supreme Court of Missouri explained Perry was not sentenced to the
misstated minimum sentence but instead to a longer eight-year sentence.205
Yet, considering the importance of the sentencing range and the lack of evidence as to why the court imposed this sentence, this should not be determinative. The Supreme Court of Missouri does not list any reasons provided by the
trial court that show the same sentence would have been imposed if the correct
range was used.206 The trial court or the prosecutor could have arrived at their
sentences by seeking the middle of the range, which would render the final
result erroneous because an incorrect range used. The fact that the trial court
did not impose the minimum sentence does not necessarily show the sentence
was not based on the incorrect range. Sentencing, at least to some degree, must
be a function of the permissible range because judges are required impose a
sentence within the statutory guidelines.207 Without additional explanation, it
is difficult to determine with any certainty that the sentence would not have
been altered if the correct range was used.

B. Difficulty of Burden
The test the Supreme Court of Missouri established creates a burden
nearly impossible for defendants to meet, and consequently, many defendants
will be denied the relief they deserve. To avoid this injustice, the Supreme
Court of Missouri should instead adopt the rebuttable presumption test used in
the federal appellate courts. The United States Supreme Court has posited sentencing judges rarely explain how the Guidelines impact their decisions.208
Further, the Third Circuit has determined it is difficult to ascertain the impact
of an erroneous Guideline range in the absence of a “fortuitous comment” from
the sentencing judge.209 Thus, the Third Circuit adopted a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, unless the record contains evidence demonstrating the error
did not impact the sentence.210 The United States Supreme Court has determined that, in most cases, if the defendant can show the trial court used an
incorrect, higher Guideline range, the defendant has established a reasonable
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).
Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 301.
See id.
State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 234 n.2 (Mo. 2013) (en banc).
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1347 (2016). This fact
played an important role in the Court’s decision to invalidate the Fifth Circuit’s “additional evidence” test, as that test failed to account for “the dynamics of federal sentencing.” Id.
209. Knight, 266 F.3d at 207.
210. Id. at 208.
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probability of a different outcome, which satisfies the federal standard for prejudice.211 Yet, in some circumstances, a reasonable probability of prejudice
might not exist.212 For example, the record could show the trial court thought
the sentence was appropriate, regardless of the sentencing range.213
In Missouri, however, a defendant must show the trial court imposed a
sentence based on the mistaken belief in order to obtain relief under plain error
review.214 Judge Breckenridge argues this burden can really only be met when
the defendant shows “he or she was sentenced solely on a mistaken belief as to
the applicable sentencing range,” which will be nearly impossible.215 Given
the realities of sentencing, the approaches used by the United States Supreme
Court and the Third Circuit are more appropriate. Often, a defendant will not
be able to meet the test the Supreme Court of Missouri established because the
sentencing judge might not explain why he or she is imposing a sentence.
Perry demonstrates this problem, as there is no explanation regarding the sentence.216 The trial court simply followed the prosecutor’s recommendation
without detailing the reasons for the sentence.217 Given this difficulty, a rebuttable presumption is more just. Under such a presumption, the defendant
would need to show the wrong sentencing range was used; then, the prosecutor
could turn to the record to establish there was truly no prejudice.218
Judicial economy is often cited as justification for creating a high burden.219 The fear is that a remand for resentencing will consume precious judicial resources.220 However, resentencing is not nearly as costly as retrial.221
As a result, fewer judicial resources will be consumed if these cases are remanded. Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
used limited remand in these cases,222 which can save some judicial resources.
For this procedure, the appellate court simply asks the district court to go on
the record and state whether a different sentence would have been imposed had
the judge known of the correct sentencing range.223 The method used by the
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346.
Id.
Id. at 1346–47.
State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 301 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
Id. at 302 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216. Id. at 301 (majority opinion).
217. Id.
218. United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2001).
219. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1348 (2016).
220. Id.
221. United States v. Wernick, 691 F.3d 108, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[R]emand
for resentencing, while not costless, does not invoke the same difficulties as a remand
for retrial . . . .”); see also United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th
Cir. 2014) (determining the cost of correction is small because the defendant need not
be released or retried).
222. United States v. Currie, 739 F.3d 960, 967 (7th Cir. 2014).
223. Id.
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Seventh Circuit can provide relief to the defendant and establish finality regarding the sentence, all at a limited cost. While judicial economy is an important concern for courts, the limited cost of resentencing and potential alternatives for this process provide a cost-efficient method for addressing this injustice; not to mention the cost of resentencing is a small price to pay to ensure
an individual is not unjustly deprived of his or her personal liberty by being
required to serve a longer sentence than is otherwise necessary.

C. Lack of Relief
As discussed above, a heavy burden is placed on a defendant, and this
burden will often be difficult to meet on plain error review. If direct appeal
fails, a defendant can then seek postconviction relief.224 The Missouri Supreme
Court Rules allow a convicted felon to challenge the ruling by “claiming that
the conviction or sentence imposed violates the constitution and laws of this
state or the constitution of the United States, including claims of ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel . . . .”225 Perry was analyzed under
plain error review because Perry did not object at the sentencing hearing.226
Perry can likely bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the
failure to object as well as his counsel’s statement the sentencing range was
correct.227 To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must
comply with the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.228 He or she “must
demonstrate that: (1) defense counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and
diligence that a reasonably competent counsel would in a similar situation[]
and (2) he or she was prejudiced by that failure.”229 The defendant must establish these criteria by a preponderance of the evidence.230
There is a strong presumption that the conduct of the counsel was effective and reasonable.231 To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test and defeat this presumption, the movant must “identify ‘specific acts or omissions of
counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of
professional competent assistance.’”232 Perry can likely meet this heavy burden, as failure to object to, and ratification of, an incorrect sentencing range
likely does not constitute professional competent assistance. Regarding the
second prong, “Prejudice occurs when ‘there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15(a).
Id.
State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 300 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
Id. at 297.
446 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
McIntosh v. State, 413 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. (quoting Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)).
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been different.’”233 Based on the Supreme Court of Missouri’s reasoning, this
will be a difficult showing for Perry. The court determined Perry failed to show
his sentence was based on the materially false belief regarding the applicable
sentencing range.234 The court determined Perry was not given the minimum
sentence and the trial court followed the prosecutor’s recommendation.235
Based on this determination, a showing of prejudice does not seem possible. If
Perry’s sentence was not based on the mistaken belief, but instead other factors,
the outcome would not have been different had the sentencing judge imposed
the correct range because those other factors are likely still present. If more
evidence exists, Perry could introduce new evidence in a postconviction relief
proceeding. However, this is unlikely because the transcript of the sentencing
hearing is the strongest evidence in this case, and the Supreme Court of Missouri had access to this on appeal. For these reasons, Perry will likely fail on
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and once again, his relief will be
denied.

D. Judicial Integrity and Public Confidence
The lack of relief for Perry seriously hinders judicial integrity and public
confidence. The federal courts have frequently addressed how the application
of an incorrect sentencing range impacts “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” as this is a factor of the federal plain error
analysis.236 Multiple federal courts have stated that sentencing a defendant in
the wrong Guideline range strongly influences the public’s perception of the
judiciary and the justness of the result.237 The Tenth Circuit has provided
thoughtful analysis in this area:
[W]hat reasonable citizen wouldn’t bear a rightly diminished view of
the judicial process and its integrity if courts refused to correct obvious
errors of their own devise that threaten to require individuals to linger
longer in federal prison than the law demands? Especially when the
cost of correction is so small? A remand for resentencing, after all,
doesn’t require that a defendant be released or retried but simply allows
the district court to exercise its authority to impose a legally permissible
sentence.238

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. (quoting Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 429 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)).
State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 301 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
Id.
See United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Weaver, 161 F.3d 528, 530 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e believe that the public’s
confidence in the judicial process would be undermined if an inadvertent typographical
error were to be allowed to influence the length of a criminal defendant’s sentence.”).
238. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d at 1333–34.
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The same concerns apply at the state level. In Perry, the prosecutor argued the incorrect range of punishment, the trial judge adopted this range, and
the defense counsel thought the sentencing range was correct, all of which resulted in an eight-year sentence.239 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri
allowed this error to stand by affirming the decision of the trial court.240 Further, as explained above, postconviction relief is unlikely. A reasonable citizen
could certainly have less respect for, and confidence in, the judicial process
given these circumstances. The law was not followed, and, consequently,
Perry might be subjected to a longer sentence as well as a more serious deprivation of liberty. “The fairness, integrity, and public reputation of our judicial
system demand that we correct . . .” some types of sentencing errors.241 In
situations like Perry, the demand is strong. Not only was the law incorrectly
applied but also no other reasons were advanced for the imposed sentence.242
Perry should have an opportunity for relief. Even if the same result is produced, at least the new sentence will result from a correct application of the
law.

VI. CONCLUSION
In State v. Perry, the Supreme Court of Missouri did not grant relief under
plain error review even though the trial judge used the incorrect sentencing
range. The court’s decision places a heavy burden on defendants and, in most
cases, eliminates defendants’ opportunities to obtain relief. As a result, an obvious error, which could adversely impact Perry’s prison sentence, has been
allowed to stand. Not only is Perry hurt by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s
decision but also public confidence in the judicial system is rightly diminished.
After all, reasonable citizens can easily have a lesser view of the judicial system
when courts refuse to correct errors they ultimately created.243 Perry, and future similarly situated defendants, should have a “right to a sentence . . . that
[is] imposed pursuant to correctly applied law.”244 In Missouri, however, it
seems no such right is guaranteed – at least when plain error review is applied.

239.
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244.

Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 300–01.
Id. at 301.
Ford, 88 F.3d at 1350.
See Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 301.
See Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d at 1333–34.
United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).
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